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This paper uses a Bayesian Belief Networks 
(BBN) methodology to assess the reliability of 
Search And Rescue (SAR) operations within 
the UK Coastguard (Maritime Rescue) 
coordination centres.  This is an extension of 
earlier work, which investigated the rationale 
of the government’s decision to close a 
number of coordination centres.  The previous 
study made use of secondary data sources and 
employed a binary logistic regression 
methodology to support the analysis.  This 
study focused on the collection of primary data 
through a structured elicitation process, which 
resulted in the construction of a BBN. 
The main findings of the study are 
that approaches such as logistic regression are 
complementary to BBN’s.  The former 
provided a more objective assessment of 
associations between variables but was 
restricted in the level of detail that could be 
explicitly expressed within the model due to 
lack of available data.  The latter method 
provided a much more detailed model but the 
validity of the numeric assessments was more 
questionable.  Each method can be used to 
inform and defend the development of the 
other. 
The paper describes in detail the 
elicitation process employed to construct the 
BBN and reflects on the potential for bias. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The UK government has recently been 
concerned with trying to improve the 
operational performance of the Maritime and 
Coastguard Agency (MCA). Since 1994, there 
have been a number of reviews of the 
effectiveness of Search And Rescue (SAR) 
operations coordinated by the MCA, 
culminating in the decision in 1999 to close a 
number of the Maritime Rescue coordination 
centres. However, there appears to have been a 
distinct lack of statistical analysis to justify 
this decision. 
 The aim of this research is to conduct 
a formal statistical analysis of the Coastguard 
SAR service in order to identify the key factors 
that influence its effectiveness and to provide a 
way of measuring this influence. An earlier 
study had been conducted with this aim, which 
made use of publicly available secondary data 
(in the form of annual Incident Statistics) and 
developed a binary logistic regression model to 
support the assessment. The findings of this 
previous study highlighted the importance of 
explanatory variables such as the scale of 
incidents, staff workload and the length of 
coastline monitored by each coordination 
centre. Such variables may be interpreted as 
providing rather crude composite indicators for 
the multitude of factors that determine the 
effectiveness of this kind of complex 
operational system. The contribution of this 
current study is to support a more detailed 
explanation of the relationship between the 
operational effectiveness of the SAR service 
and identifiable causal factors.  
 In section 2 we present a background 
to the problem.   In particular, we summarise 
some key issues that were raised during public 
inquiry into the closure of the coordination 
centres.  In section 3 we present an outline of 
the structured elicitation processes we 
employed for this study and identify various 
compromises made during the implementation 
of the process.  Section 4 is a summary of the 
key findings from the study and its 
shortcomings.  In section 5 we reflect on the 




UK Coastguard (Maritime Rescue) 
coordination centres and sub-centres do not 
themselves undertake rescues. Instead, SAR 
equipment is strategically positioned around 
the UK coast to meet specified response times; 
the personnel using the equipment tend to be 
local volunteers. There are currently nearly 400 
such sites around the UK. However, the staff at 
the coordination centres play the vital role of 
communicating with the casualty, assessing the 
scale of the distress, selecting the appropriate 
SAR response, and activating that response by 
alerting the relevant personnel and directing 
them to the casualty. They continue to fulfil 
this function until the emergency is over.  
In the mid-1990s , there were 21 UK 
Coastguard districts, each with its own 
coordination centre. From 1994 onwards, there 
were a number of reviews of, and reports on, 
the Coastguard service concerning the 
organisation of these districts. From 1994 until 
1996, the MCA conducted the ‘Focus for 
Change’ review. One of its key 
recommendations was to introduce a new 
grade of Coastguard Watch Assistants to assist 
(and, in certain cases, to substitute for) the 
Watch Keeping Officers working in the 
coordination centres. This recommendation 
was implemented in 1996-97. 
In 1997, the MCA set out their view 
of the future in the ‘Five Year Strategy’ 
consultation document. This document 
contained two key proposals: (1) to invest in a 
new ‘Integrated Coastguard Communications 
System’ (ICCS), and (2) to reduce the number 
of co-ordination centres from 21 to 17. One of 
the main justifications given for the proposed 
closure programme was to provide greater 
exposure of Watch Keeping Officers to a wider 
spectrum of incidents (in order to produce 
more experienced staff and to provide greater 
job satisfaction). 
In 1998, a report from the 
(parliamentary) Committee of Public Accounts 
expressed concern that without remedial 
action, ‘local knowledge’ would be lost if 
closures of coordination centres went ahead. In 
response to these serious concerns, the UK 
Government asked Lord Donaldson to conduct 
an overall ‘Review of the Five Year Strategy 
for HM Coastguard’1. His report was 
published in August 1999. In this review, Lord 
Donaldson accepted the case for closing three 
coordination centres but rejected the case for 
the fourth. These recommendations were based 
on striking a balance between staff workload 
and the local knowledge required by staff to 
deliver an effective service.  
Using the probability of a life being 
saved as the dependent variable, van der Meer 
et al
2
 developed a binary logistic regression 
model to explain the difference in performance 
between the 21 different coordination centres. 
The average scale of incidents, staff workload 
and the length of coastline monitored (as a 
possible proxy for the local knowledge 
required) were found to be significant 
explanatory variables. This study  found that 
the model developed was considerably more 
realistic and complex than any model that may 
have been used by the UK Government, and 
also that the coordination centres selected for 
closure were not necessarily the ones that were 
least effective in their primary purpose (i.e. to 
save lives). 
Such regression studies, based on the 
use of aggregate statistics, can only be of 
limited use as at best they provide rather crude 
composite indicators for the multitude of 
factors that are actually involved. 
 
This provided the motivation to 
conduct interviews with the watchstaff and 
construct a more detailed model of the factors 
that influence the effectiveness of operations.  
A BBN modelling approach was chosen as it 
would facilitate the integration of information 
from various sources, such as government 




3 STRUCTURED ELICITATION 
PROCESS 
 
Three semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with watchstaff each from different 
centres about the UK.  This information was 
used to construct the influence diagram.  
Quantification of the influence diagram was 
obtained through an elicitation exercise with 
one person who was watch staff but is 
presently a union representative and therefore 
removed from the day-to-day operations of the 
centres.   
This section describes the process 
used to elicit and validate the data acquired 
from the interviews.  The process for 
quantifying the BBN was adapted from the 
general SRI
3
 approach to structured elicitation 
for bias management.  At each stage we 
highlight potential biases within the data.   
 
Step One- Identify Variables 
Interviews were restricted to those members of 
the coastguard who responded to a request, 
which was conducted through the watchstaff 
union.  This brings into question the validity of 
the interviews, as all respondents were self 
selected and could not be interpreted as being 
neutral given the political atmosphere within 
the organisation due to the closure of centres. It 
was felt that this bias could be kept to a 
minimum by careful wording of the questions 
and ensuring that the interview remained as 
impartial as possible.  Three interviews were 
conducted from the Scotland and Northern 
Ireland regions.  
The interviewees were asked a 
number of questions relating to the risk factors 
associated with the effectiveness of SAR co-
ordination such as the effect of local 
knowledge, which outside factors influence the 
SAR operation and the staffing levels within 
the operations room. Each interview was 
recorded, with the interviewee’s permission, to 
ensure that all details were accurately recorded.  
After each interview took place the 
transcripts were written up within three days. 
Once all three interviews took place the 
answers to each section of the interview were 
collated in order to find the common elements 
to each.  
This information and other data 
gained from various government reports, 
internal communications and MCA reports 
was then used to identify all the relevant 
variables to this problem situation. 
 
Step Two- Identify network Structure 
The variables identified in the previous stage 
of the BBN process, along with the linkages 
identified by the interviewees were then used 
to build a causal map of the situation in order 
to gain an understanding of the influences and 
relationships involved. 
There were found to be five nodes 
which directly influence the outcome 
“Effective Search And Rescue Operation”- 
“Scale of Rescue Operation”, “Outside 
Factors”, “Technological Failure”, 
“Availability of Auxiliary Coastguards” and 
“Appropriate Staffing Levels in Operations 
Room”. 
 
Step Three - Model Validation 
Once the model had been built it was given to 
the union representative, himself an 
experienced watch staff person to identify any 
shortcomings and errors/omissions within the 
model.  It was intended that it would be 
circulated about other watchstaff personnel for 
further validation but due to this request 
coincided with a particularly busy time for the 
union as a whole. Therefore, the final influence 
diagram was only validated by the union 
representative.   
 
Step Four - Conditional Probabilities 
Often experts may find it difficult to express 
probabilities and find it hard to relate a number 
to their beliefs
4
. When people talk about 
probabilities they frequently prefer to use 
words rather than numbers. Verbal 
probabilities can be claimed to be more natural 
to produce and easier to understand than 
numerical probabilities, however, they can be 
harder to validate and more vague. 
One issue relating to the use of 
numerical scales is the number of expressions 
available to describe varying degrees of 
probability. A scale with a smaller number of 
expressions is recommended as it is felt that it 
would be easier for the expert to distinguish 
between this number of categories, whilst still 
retaining a large enough number to indicate 
significant differences in probabilities. 
Another issue associated with this 
form of describing probabilities is the fact that 
there will be variations in interpretation of 
each expression. Druzdzel
5
 reports that 
previous studies have found significant within-
subject consistency (experts are consistently 
using the same expression to represent the 
same level of probability). However, between-
subject consistency (different experts are 
consistently using the same expression to 
represent the same level of probability) has 
reportedly achieved much lower consistency. 
For the purposes of this research it 
was decided to adopt the scale as developed by 
Renooij and Witteman
4
, as it was felt that the 
clear use of the scale, along with relatively 
simple design facilitated the elicitation process 
more effectively than the more cluttered, and 
perhaps confusing scales available. In addition, 
the representation of the scale upon a line 
makes it easy for the expert to rank the 
probabilities in his/her own mind. 
Figure 1 is a copy of the scale which 
was presented to the expert each time a 
probability was requested. The following five 
stages relate to the SRI process of eliciting 
subjective probabilities. 
 
Step 4A Motivating 
The purpose of the model was again presented 
to the union representative to ensure he 
understood the influence of each of the factors 
upon the effectiveness of a rescue of a person 
at peril as represented in the model. The 
structure of the model was discussed and 
checked to ensure that it was accurate. This 
also helped to verify the structure of the model. 
A number of changes took place as a result of 
this verification.   
 
Stage 4B- Structuring 
The definition of each of the variables was 
discussed, and the states of them to ensure they 
made sense.   
The next part of this stage involved going 
over the scale to be used and defining each 
probability.  
  
Stage 4C- Conditioning 
The interviewee was asked if there were any 
major events that have occurred recently which 
could influence the probabilities he would be 
providing. He highlighted that much of the 
recent Trade Union activity has been involved 
with the Transport Select committee and 
evidence from this may have influenced his 
probabilities. It was discussed that as far as 
possible he should use only his own experience 





Figure 1 Linguistic/Numerical Scale 
 
 
Figure 2: Bayesian Belief Network 
 
Stage 4D- Encoding 
The interviewee was invited to use the scale as 
in Figure 1.  The probabilities were often 
initially assessed as frequencies, such as “once 
every week of standard watchkeeping routine”. 
However, it became clear that the interviewee 
was comfortable stating probabilities which 
were not on the scale, such as 40% etc. It was 
felt that so long as he was producing 
probabilities which were consistent that this 
was more acceptable than forcing him to use a 
scale which quite arbitrarily chosen. 
Probabilities for each cluster of nodes 
were elicited one at a time. At this stage there 
were also occasions when the structure of the 
model was changed slightly to reflect the 
interviewee’s view of the problem situation.  
It helped to have the influence 
diagram in front of both the researcher and the 
interviewee as it focussed attention on the task 
at hand and simplified communication. 
 
Stage 4E- Verifying 
As stated above the structure of the model had 
been verified both at the motivating and 
encoding stages. In addition at frequent points 
throughout the encoding stage the probabilities 
were rephrased in order to verify them.   The 
resulting BBN is illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
 
4 REFLECTION ON THE 
ELICITATION PROCESS 
 
There are several outcomes and learning points 
that have been obtained through the elicitation 
process as described above.  These include 
issues concerning validity and triangulation of 
results. 
There were several changes in the 
structure of the model, mainly concerned with 
the linkage between the district concerned, 
seasonality, weather and type of incidents that 
occur. In addition nodes relating to wind 
factor, comparability with similar roles and 
VHF radio frequency were added to the 
original model, and the node concerning 
network coverage was removed. In short, the 
structure continued to be modified after it had 
been “verified” when the numerical elicitation 
was being conducted. 
The union representative himself has 
acknowledged the fact that he has been out of 
the Operations Room of a SAR facility for a 
number of years and as such his day to day 
experience of many of the factors within the 
BBN model are several years out of date.  
Additionally, on several occasions the 
union representative referred to the fact that 
much of his information comes from other 
people within the field, indicating that it is not 
based upon his own experiences, which is not 
surprising given he has been operationally 
inactive as described above. This again calls 
into question the reliability of the data, as the 
information obtained for the model is 
secondary and not primary data. 
However, it is felt that with future 
work these issues can be overcome by carrying 
out the elicitation process with many more 
experts in order to gain a consensus, and thus 
increase both the reliability and validity of the 
data. 
With regards to staffing levels the 
model built shows that there must be a match 
between the needs of each station, as identified 
by the correct prediction of staff requirements 
and the number of available staff at each grade. 
If these two do not match there is the serious 
risk that staff will not be able to cope with the 
demands of the job, or conversely have so little 
contact with emergency situations that they 
will be unable to respond effectively. The 
importance of valuing staff through training, 
and recruitment of staff with the appropriate 
skills and competencies for the roles is also 
highlighted.  This is echoed by the statistical 
analysis that was conducted with the logistical 
regression analysis and the findings of the 
Transport Select Committee.  
 
 
5 Synergies Between Logistic 
Regression and BBN’s 
 
The findings of the logistic regression 
investigation into the secondary data identified 
the number of lives at risk per incident as an 
important environmental factor influencing the 
effectiveness of SAR operations. In fact this 
variable remained the strongest, most 
influential variable, indicating the size of an 
incident has the strongest influence upon the 
likelihood of a desirable outcome. 
The BBN analysis concerning 
environmental factors identified several other 
factors that the coastguard do not officially 
measure, and consequently do not publish 
statistics. However, one of the variables also 
relates to the scale of the incident, which 
supports the findings of the statistical analysis. 
The process of eliciting the BBN 
identified differences in performance due to 
the location of the centres.  Differences were 
detected through the logistic regression 
between centres, however, due to the inclusion 
of the explanatory variable of length coastline, 
much of these differences were attributed to 
coastline length.  Therefore, the outcome of the 
BBN study will inform the type of data to be 
collected to improve the logistic regression 
model.    
Both the statistical and BBN analysis 
highlighted similar issues surrounding the 
staffing levels within an operations room.  
Follow up statistical analysis of more recent 
publicly available data highlighted that there 
has been a change in the direction of influence 
of the workload of officers; simply higher 
workloads were associated with increasing the 
chances of a successful rescue but more recent 
data suggests it reduces the chances of a 
successful rescue.  This was also supported by 
the findings of several Transport Committee 
reports, which found that consistent 
understaffing, deputising above grade and poor 
quality of new staff at lower levels have all 
lead to a decrease in the effectiveness of staff 
within an operations room. 
The process of constructing the 
BBN’s through multiple interviews resulted in 
a deeper understanding of validity (and lack 
there of) of the surrogate measures used with 
the logistic regression.  For example, the 
variable of staff was decomposed to capture 
the impact of Auxiliary Coastguard.   
In summary, BBN’s provide more 
explanatory detail to support a more effective 
operational improvements but validity of the 
resulting model is an issue.  This was a 
concern with this study because of the political 
atmosphere that existed due to the closure of 
SAR centres.  As such, we found that the 
binary logistic regression study was useful is 
providing validity to the inclusion of certain 
variables in the model and could be used to 
evaluate some of the quantification provided 
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